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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to examine Union conduct 
in Alabama toward non-combatants and private property.
The status of international law and the United States 
Army's experience with and regulation of conduct has been 
surveyed. This survey established a standard to compare 
with the conduct in Alabama.
General histories of the war, Union company histories 
and personal histories were consulted to determine what took 
place in Alabama.
Generally, conduct in Alabama did not meet the standard 
laid down by international law or even Army regulations. No 
single factor appeared to be the major cause, although the 
use of a largely non-professional body of troops was probably 
the main reason for such general misconduct.
RONALD EDWARD COLVIN 
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY 
THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY IN VIRGINIA
THE JUST OBJECTS OF WAR
INTRODUCTION
Throughout history non-combatants have suffered during 
wars, even though they take no active part in the hostilities. 
Western civilization has recognized that these citizens and 
their property deserve protection, inaccordance with stan­
dards known collectively as international law. This paper 
will study the conduct of the Union army in Alabama during 
the Civil War.
To accomplish such a study it is important to understand 
standards of conduct followed during the mid-nineteenth cen­
tury. Looking at the record from today's perspective, one's 
interpretation may be colored by the United States' recent 
experiences with war, i.e. World War II, Korea and Viet Nam.
To better appreciate the Union field soldier's position a 
brief look at international law as it was understood at the 
time is included. This is not to suggest, however, that the 
common soldier was familiar with international law and guided 
his actions accordingly. More important to the understanding 
of the Union soldier's perspective is an examination of United 
States Army regulations for the period, as well as the army's 
experience in the Mexican War, which guided many Federal of­
ficers': decisions on troop conduct during the Civil War.
Unlike Virginia, Tennessee, and Mississippi, Alabama did 
not see large-scale combat. Instead, a Union army was faced 
by small bands of home guards and cavalry, which were quickly 
labeled guerrillas. Alabama was visited by Union forces for 
two reasons; to secure the Tennessee Valley as a transportation
2
corridor for the Union, and to raid the interior portions of 
the state in order to destory sources of supplies for the 
Confederate army.
Conduct will be examined in light of the two different 
Union objectives and the different tactics employed to accom­
plish them. The Tennessee Valley saw long periods of 
occupation, while large cavalry raids of short duration were 
employed to strike into the heart of Alabama. The effect 
on Federal forces of a large population with Unionist senti­




At the time of the Civil War the United States had
no codified rules of conduct governing the treatment of
civilians and private property. International law, however,
provided a loose code of conduct for belligerents.
A short definition of international law from the
Ericyclopaedia of the Social Sciences reads as follows:
International Law is a binding body of rules ap­
plied by and to states in their international 
intercourse. ...The sources or agencies by which 
the rules of international law are formulated are 
either usage, giving rise to custom, or positive 
agreement or treaties.1
The origin of international law lies in the commercial 
and diplomatic intercourse of the ancient western civil­
izations, i.e., the Greeks, the Romans and the Jews. Their 
distinctions between friendly and hostile peoples, their 
treaties with other nations, their conduct of war, and their 
making of peace illustrate early principles of international 
law. Modern international law is most often traced to the 
writings of Hugo Grotius, 1583-1645, and his work De Jure 
belli ac pacis.... A Dutch jurist and statesman, Grotius 
codified international law as it then existed. "The impor­
tance of Grotius' work lies in the fact that it exerted so 
profound an influence, not only on theory, but on p r a c t i c e . ' ' ^  
International law grew by accepting,a& precedents, rules 
adopted among the major powers in negotiated treaties of 
peace, or the decisons of prize courts and other bodies 
established to determine international legal relations.
4
5It was during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
that international law reached an important stage in its 
development. The treatises on international law by Grotius, 
Vitoria, Pufendorf and others also included laws of warfare. 
The idea that the power of the belligerent in waging war was 
not unlimited gained credence.3 The laws of warfare were de­
veloping within international law, and each war added to the 
precedent of what was considered humane and reasonable con­
duct. In 1818, the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle formally re­
cognized the law of nations as the basis for international 
relations.4 This same period saw the development of a basic 
tenet of modern international law. This was the principle 
that all nations were bound under a doctrine of international 
law, even though the precedent action involved other nations.
By the nineteenth century, international law had 
evolved into a mass of confusing rules, little understood by 
regular United States Army officers, let alone a volunteer 
private. During the Mexican War, United States Army officials 
often had to deal with questions concerning international law. 
One of the officers required to answer these questions was 
Brevet Captain Henry W. Halleck. He served in California as 
Secretary of State under Generals Mason and Reily, and as 
chief of staff of General Burton's operations in Lower Calif­
ornia. His service as aide-de-camp to Commodore Shubrick and 
as lieutenant-governor of Mazatlan gave him added experience 
with international law.
Halleck, a West Point graduate, resigned from the re­
gular army in 1854 and opened what was to become one of the
6leading law firms in California. Between 1854 and the out­
break of the Civil War, he wrote several works dealing with 
law and military tactics.; In 1861, he published a compendium 
of international law for officers in the army and navy.
Halleck relied on his practical experience in the Mexican War 
as well as the major European treatises.
In August, 1861, he was commissioned a Major General 
in the regular United States Army. In 186 2, he was made 
military advisor to the President with the title of General- 
in-Chief, a position he held for almost two years and from 
which he was able to influence the army1s adherence to the 
rules of international law. In March of 1864, he was named 
Chief of Staff of the Army, a position concerned mainly with 
office work and more compatible with his organizational 
talents. Halleck*s treatise, entitled International Law, 
served to illustrate the position of the United States govern­
ment on standards of military conduct, and particularly the 
United States Army's understanding of international law at 
the onset of the Civil War. Its ideas continued to be influ­
ential throughout the war.
International law had long recognized a difference be­
tween combatants and non-combatants. Although the national­
istic warfare of the Napoleonic era had confused the issue, 
there remained a definite standard. Halleck reported:
Thus, while we may lawfully kill those who are 
actually in arms and continue to resist, we may 
not take the lives of those who are not in arms, 
or who, being in arms, cease their resistance 
and surrender themselves into our p o w e r . 5
7As a result of the levee en masse and nationalistic war, the 
idea of considering all inhabitants of the adversary nation 
as enemies, (no longer protected against the direct operations 
of war) gained in popularity. By 1861, however, thought on 
the subject had returned to protection of the non-combatant 
as an international legal obligation. In discussing those 
persons who were exempt from such operations, Halleck listed:
g
"Feeble old men, women, and children, and sick persons..."
Even though they were enemies and were subject to the army
as members of a community at war, they were enemies who made
no resistance. Halleck said, "We have no right to maltreat
their persons, or to use any violence toward them, much less
7
take their lives.." Included in the list of persons with
this right of protection in 1861 were several professions.
As long as the persons remained non-combatants, members of
the religious, educational, and agricultural professions as
well as artists, laborers, and merchants were protected. In
sum, Halleck believed that international law protected all
those who took no part in war and made no resistance to the
8arms of the adversary nation.
In discussing the rights of inhabitants of an occupied 
area, Halleck was more specific. He once again reaffirmed the 
principle of protection only for the non-combatant. He 
stressed the fact that once a person began to resist, protection 
ceased.
...if the peasantry and common people of a country 
use force, or commit acts in violation of the milder 
rules of modern warfare, they subject themselves to 
the common, fate of military men, and sometime to 
still harsher treatment.9
8As long as they remained non-combatants, they were to be 
allowed the enjoyment of their property and the pursuit of 
their vocation. However, Halleck and international law 
left a "loop-hole" for the rights of the military commander.
Halleck wrote that if the commander had any reason to 
mistrust the inhabitants, he had a right to disarm them and 
to require security for their good conduct. Halleck also 
considered it proper to imprison inhabitants to prevent them 
from taking up arms or in order to weaken the enemy. He con­
sidered it permissible to confine even women and children if 
circumstances, as determined by the commander, rendered such 
an action necessary "in order to secure the just objects of 
war.”^  Military commanders had considerable leeway. Re­
pressive measures against a populace could be justified by 
military necessity. Each commander could have his personal 
view of what each situation required.
In some cases the only guaranteed right of the non- 
combatant was life. The military commander, however, was 
not entirely free to do as he chose. He had to justify his 
repressive actions, or the enemy might carry out reprisals, 
or he might, face public condemnation: under "moral law".
Concerning the subject of property in areas coming 
under the control of a belligerent armed force, one has to 
deal with a long history of changing principles. The ancient 
practice gave the invading belligerent the right of seizure 
and confiscation of all private property. These rights were 
modified through the years until plunder and wanton destruc­
tion were condemned. By 1861, certain types of property were
9recognized as being exempt from capture. Also, compensation
for the requisition of private property was a universal
principle, but not always followed by the soldiers in the
field. ,
However, there were exceptions to this "rule" of
compensation.
The modern usage is, not to touch private property 
on land, without making compensation, except in 
certain specified cases. These exceptions may be 
stated under three general heads; 1st, confisca­
tions or seizures by way of penalty for military 
offenses; 2d, forced contributions for the sup­
port of the invading armies, or as an indemnity 
for the expenses of maintaining order, and af­
fording protection to the conquered inhabitants; 
and 3d, property taken on the field, or in 
storming a fortress or town.H
The laws of warfare relied to a great extent on the 
morality of the individual commander to determine what was 
correct and proper conduct toward non-combatants and pri­
vate property. However, it did give the commander several 
guidelines to follow concerning the correct treatment of 
property. Exempted from operations of war were works of 
art, state papers, public archives, historical records and 
legal documents. Also, several structures were included 
in the exemption. These were such buildings that were 
devoted to civil purposes only, those of religious character, 
public edifices and all monuments of art and repositories of 
science. Halleck stated that such destruction would not aid
the war effort and, on the contrary, would cause the populace
12to harbor resentment that would last long after the war.
Recognizing that excesses are committed during the 
war, international law, combined with the American experience
10
in Mexico, led Halleck to devise a formula for fixing
responsibility. Recalling the experience of trying to
control volunteer troops in Mexico, Halleck placed them in •
a somewhat separate category, seemingly to protect the
honor of the regular army. He stated:
It is true that soldiers sometime commit excesses 
which their officers cannot prevent; but, in gen­
eral, a commanding officer is responsible for the 
acts of those under his orders, unless he can con­
trol his soldiers, he is unfit to command them.
The most atrocious crimes in war, however, are 
committed by militia, and volunteers, suddenly 
raised from the population of large cities, and 
sent to the field before the general has time or 
opportunity to reduce them to order and discipline.
In such cases the responsibility of their crimes 
rests upon the state which employed them, rather 
than upon the general who is, perhaps, unwillingly 
obliged to use t h e m . 13
In many cases, excesses committed by soldiers in the 
field resulted from living off the land, a practice still 
prevalent in the mid-nineteenth century. During the Civil 
War, great advances were made in the science of logistics. 
Federal quartermasters prided themselves on the quantity 
and quality of supplies provided the troops. Railroads were 
utilized to a great extent for the swift supply of the armies, 
but they were often inadequate, forcing supplemental local 
"requisitions". In many cases, however, the army simply 
made it. a policy to live off the land. Recognizing the 
dangers of unregulated foraging and the power of an army to 
confiscate as it pleased, international law dealt with the 
subject at length. Halleck,. in compiling his findings, wrote:
The evils resulting from irregular requisitions 
and foraging for the ordinary supplies of an army, 
are so very great and so generally admitted that
it has become a recognized maxim of war, that the 
commanding officer who permits indiscriminate 
pillage, and allows the taking of private property 
without strict accountability, whether he be en­
gaged in offensive or defensive operations, fails 
in his duty to his own government, and violates 
the usages of modern warfare.^
Halleck made it clear that due restitution should be
made to the victims of pillage by deductions from the pay
and allowances of the corps which committed the excess.
If, however, pillage was the result of the army ordered
into circumstances where proper logistical support was not
possible, responsibility was transferred to the government,
as it had failed to make proper provision for the support
of its troops or had required services which could not be
performed without injury to the inhabitants of the hostile 
15country.
Even though Halleck cleared the commander of the 
responsibility for such action in the above mentioned cir­
cumstances, he clearly disapproved generally of the practice. 
He advocated the maintenance of a regular magazine for the 
subsistence of an army. Recognizing that this was not altf 
ways possible, and knowing that forced contributions was 
still, a recognized right, Halleck nevertheless recommended 
that a cautious policy should be declared and just com­
pensation made for items taken. International legal thought 
had come to see the consequence of individual foraging as 
"universal pillage, and a total relaxation of discipline, 
the loss of private property and the violation of individual 
rights".16
12
Clearly a thin line was drawn between what was con­
sidered just and unjust in the process of finding subsist­
ence for an army, but certainly a commander was obligated to 
be in control of his men and restrain all individual con­
fiscation. Admittedly, international law in 1861 left a 
great deal of uncertainty. One restriction upon the in­
vading army, however, was very clear, as Halleck found in 
his research. "There is no doubt, whatever, respecting its 
[an enemy's property] waste and useless destruction. This
17is forbidden alike by law of nature, and the rules of war."
Another aspect of property in war dealt with by inter­
national law was the right of title to captured material. 
Soldiers had long considered the booty captured during the 
course of a campaign as their personal property. This arose 
out of the practice in previous wars in which such booty 
was considered part of the soldiers1 compensation. With the 
rise of nationalistic armies, soldiers were regularly pro­
vided subsistence and monetary compensation. This develop­
ment caused international legal thought to advocate the 
following principle in 1861.
All captures in war, whether conquests, prizes or 
booty, naturally belong to the state in whose name, 
and by whose authority they are made. It alone 
has such claims against the enemy as will authorize 
the seizure and conversion of his property; the 
military forces who make the seizures are merely 
the instruments of the state, employed for this 
purpose; they do not act on their individual re­
sponsibility, or for their individual benefit.
They, therefore, have no other claim to the booty 
or prizes which they may take, than their govern­
ment may see fit to allow them.1**
International law concerning troop conduct was not al­
ways clear. Generally speaking, the invading army had many
13
rights over the inhabitants, but "moral law" restricted
%■ *
their implementation, except under obvious hostile con­
ditions. Along with the rights an invading army possessed, 
it also had many duties to the subjugated populace. It 
had the responsibility of providing a government under 
which non-combatants could pursue their occupations in as 
nearly normal conditions as possible. Wanton destruction 
and pillage were clearly condemned, responsibility lying 
not only with the commander, but with the nation-state.
In summing up the correct policy toward an invaded or 
occupied land, Halleck quoted Emmer de Vattel.
The general rule by which we should regulate our 
conduct toward an enemy, is that of moderation, 
and on no occasion should we unnecessarily de­
stroy his property. 'The pillage and destruction 
of towns,' say Vattel, 'the devastation of the 
open country, ravaging and setting fire to houses, 
are measures no less odious and detestable, on 
every occasion when they are evidently put into 
practice without absolute necessity, or at least 
very cogent reasons. But as the perpetrators of 
such outrageous deeds might attempt to palliate 
them under pretext of deservedly punishing the 
enemy, be it here observed that the natural and 
voluntary law of nations does not allow us to 
inflict such punishment, except for enormous 
offences against the law of nations.^
Overshadowing the American Civil War, though, was 
the debate as to whether international law actually applied. 
Many, including Lincoln, believed that only municipal law 
applied. The South was seen as a rebellious population 
usurping federal power on federal territory and thus to be 
suppressed in terms of criminal law. They saw the Confed­
erates: as rebels and eligible for prosecution as traitors 
and murderers. Halleck did not deal extensively with civil 
war in International L a w but the interpretation one ob-
14
tained was that a situation like that found in the
United States 1861-1865 should have been termed a
rebellion. Eramer de Vattel, a Swiss jur±s~t whose The Law
of Nations was the most widely quoted foreign treatise in
the United States, was somewhat more generous in application
20of international law for such situations. He wrote m  
1793:
When a party is formed in a state, who no longer 
obeys the sovereign, and are possessed of suf­
ficient strength to oppose him, — or when, in 
a republic, the nation is divided into two op­
posite factions, and both sides take up arms,—  
this is called Civil War. A civil war breaks 
the bands of society and government, or at least 
suspends their force and effect? it produces in 
the nation two independent parties, who consider 
each other as enemies, and acknowledge no common 
judge. Those two parties, therefore, must neces­
sarily be considered as thenceforward constituting, 
at least for a time, two separate bodies, two 
distinct societies. They stand therefore in pre­
cisely the same predicament as two nations, who 
engage in a contest, and, being unable to come 
to an agreement, have recourse to a r m s . 2 1
Many did not view the situation in this manner, they 
assumed that to apply the term "civil war" and the juris­
diction of international law to the conflict would mean re­
cognizing the Confederate government as legitimate. It 
was not until the first battle of Manassas, when prisoners 
were taken by the Confederates, that the questions was ad­
dressed seriously. Eventually, Lincoln was convinced that 
granting the rules of war was not a tantamount to recognizing 
legitimacy. "Thus it may be said that the rights assumed in 
occupied regions of the South were the recognized rights of 
military occupation plus that authority which the Union gov­
ernment exerted in the resumption of Federal functions and
in the temporary assumption of State functions while
22awaiting the establishment of 'loyal1 State governments."
The conflict was termed an insurrection by the Federals ; 
under international law, rebels could be tried for high treason. 
Lincoln's position was compromised by the fact that he had, 
according to contemporary international law, recognized the 
Confederacy's belligerent rights when proclaiming a naval 
blockade of the Southern coast on April 19, 1861.
Chapter II 
United States Army Heritage
The Union army was not one that was highly versed 
in the mysteries of international law. Much of it was 
made up of men taken from civilian life who had little con­
cept of a soldier's duties, rights, or responsibilities.
Many times the lack of clear cut army directives forced 
them to rely on their personal opinions or a known pre­
cedent in United States Army history.
The regular army's regulations and articles of war 
touched on the subject of proper conduct and were consistent 
with prevailing international thought. The problem was that 
the bulk of the federal army was made up of volunteers, segre­
gated organizationally from regular troops, who had little 
sympathy for the rules governing the professional soldier, 
especially if the rules appeared to delay the defeat of the 
"secesh".
The Articles of War for the army dated from 1776.
These general rules of conduct were revised in 1786 and 1806, 
with the latter revision remaining in effect for the Civil 
War. Two articles expressed themselves directly to the pro­
blem of troop conduct.
Article fifty-two, stated in part:
Any officer or soldier...who shall quit his post 
or colors to plunder and pillage,...being duly 
convicted thereof, shall suffer death, or such 
other punishment as shall be ordered by the 
sentence of a general court-martial.
Article fifty-four addressed the question in more detail.
All officers and soldiers are to behave themselves
16
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orderly in quarters and on their march; and who­
ever shall commit any waste or spoil, either in 
walks of trees, parks, warrens, fish-ponds, houses, 
or gardens, cornfields, enclosures of meadows, or 
shall maliciously destroy any property whatsoever 
belonging to the inhabitants of the United States, 
unless by order of the then Commander-in-chief of 
the armies of the said States, shall (besides such 
penalties as they are liable to by law) be punished 
according to the nature and degree of the offense 
by the judgement of a regimental or general court- 
martial. ^
The Regulations for the Army of the United States 
also dealt with the subject of a soldier's conduct. Al­
though primarily concerned with such practical aspects as 
how to properly dig a latrine or to define the proper feed 
for a pack mule, it was consistent and supportive of the 
Articles of War. Regulation 787 stated:
Plundering and marauding, at all times disgraceful 
to: soldiers, when committed on the persons or pro­
perty of those whom it is the duty of the Army to 
protect, become crimes of such enormity as to 
admit no remission of the awful punishment which 
the military law awards against offenses of this
nature.3
The varied and confused opinions on the status of the 
citizens of the Southern Confederacy led many soldiers to 
believe that these regulations did not apply. However, the 
Judge Advocate General of the Army, in January of 1866, re­
viewed a case in which soldiers had been convicted under 
article fifty-four. They had "entered without authority the 
house of an inhabitant, and committed waste and seized and
4
appropriated property therein." The Judge Advocate General 
held, "they were chargeable with a violation of this article 
was evidently framed to punish such acts, under any circum-
5
stances, as breaches of military discipline."
18
Although not clearly defined until after the war, 
it was apparent that the army had an obligation to maintain 
discipline. Halleck had stated in International Law such 
discipline included restricting individual actions by 
soldiers, no matter the indentity or beliefs of the victim.
For far too many federal troops, army regulations 
and codes of conduct were almost as mysterious as inter­
national law. Experience and the consensus of junior of­
ficers 1 opinions guided the actions of many volunteer and 
conscript troops. The Mexican War proved to be the exper­
ience that many of the senior members of the armed forces 
used as a guide. The United States had its first taste of 
military government over an occupied area in that war.
Many aspects, though, were not the same. In Mexico, the 
United States was dealing with an acknowledged foreign 
power, while during the Civil War it claimed to repressing 
a domestic rebellion. Nevertheless, experience with martial 
law and military courts was gained during the Mexican War 
that set a precedent for policy in the Civil War.
Congress in 1846 saw that hostile territory would 
soon be coming under United States military control. The 
question of what would be the proper governmental adminis­
trative policy for this territory was debated for several 
days. One position advocated was that of "no holds barred," 
but this was quickly rebutted.
The [Congress] relegated the realism of 1Inter 
arma leges silent1 to the distant barbarous past.
They believed in progress and they defined civil­
ization in moral terms. [Congress] did not go
19
beyond the vague generalization that American com­
manders in Mexico should be limited and controlled 
by the 1 law of nations' and the affirmation that 
these laws stemmed ultimately from the fundamental 
moral law.8
However, it was left to the army to implement a for­
mula for a government. General Winfield Scott on February 
19th/ 1847, laid the foundation for a definite policy. He 
declared martial law in all areas of Mexico that were oc­
cupied,. and set up a system of military courts previously 
unknown to the United States military service. This was a 
military commission which could try both civilians and 
soldiers accused of criminal actions within the occupied 
areas. These provisions were part of General Orders
7
No. 20, issued from Tampico. Also included in General 
Orders No. 20 were the offenses that would be tried in the 
tribunals.
Assassinations; murder; malicious stabbing or 
maiming; rape; malicious assault and battery; 
robbery; theft; the wanton desecration of 
churches, cemeteries or other religious edifices 
and fixtures, and the destruction, except by 
order of a superior officer, of public or pri­
vate property, and such offenses.8
This order, though tailored for the specific needs of the 
Mexican situation, was a document which gave specific content 
to the vague term "laws of. warfare" and provided for enforce­
ment of those laws..
It was during the Mexican War that principles were de­
vised to deal with guerrilla action. The long supply lines 
invited guerrilla attack.. Scott's reaction was that it was 
the nearest alcalde's (mayor's) responsibility to deliver up 
the guilty. If he chose not to, the alcalde was to be fined
20
and any person known to belong to a guerrilla party could
be summarily tried by three officers, and either flogged
or excecuted. This plan did not satisfy those having to
undergo the risks of attack and "in general, it was a tale
9
of merciless atrocities followed by merciless reprisals."
Villages suspected of harboring the "banditti" were burned.
In July, 1847, General J. E. Wool announced "that any
guerrillas caught by him would be executed. In December,
1847, he issued his famous Order 11, which not only made
the Mexican authorities and their towns responsible for all
damages done, but required them to hunt down the 'brigands'."^
With these, and similar actions, the principle was
established that citizens residing near the scene of any
guerrilla action were to be held responsible and suffer for
them. At the time of the capture of Mexico City, General
Scott held this theory of responsibility strongly.
Soon after the Americans entered it [Mexico City],
Mexicans fired upon them from houses. Before long
the First Alcalde issued this warning: * The General- 
in-Chief [Scott] of the American forces which have 
occupied the city this morning has informed the 
Ayuntamiento [city council]' that if within three 
hours, reckoned from the time this notice is posted, 
there is not complete cessation of the acts of 
hostility now being committed..., he will proceed 
with all. rigor against the guilty permitting their 
goods and property to be sacked and razing the block 
in which are situated the houses from which the 
American troops are fired upon.*
...These warnings were not effectual, however; and 
General Worth wrote to his daughter, 'I caused the 
heavy guns to be turned against every house from 
which a shot came ... and after a few hours of 
such appliance, not regarding where or who it hit, 
quelled the dastardly villains.*11
By the end of the Mexican War, the above principle 
had been accepted as policy by the United States Army and
21
was to be revived in the Civil War. Vattel in his classic 
work on international law, The Law of Nations, dealt exten­
sively with guerrilla actions. Written in the late eight­
eenth century the 1817 edition did not mention such a 
policy or condone it under international law. Halleck, 
writing in 1861, from his interpretation of the Mexican
War, stated: "It is a general law of war, that communities
12are accountable, for the acts of their individual members.”
As General-in-Chief from July 1862 to March 1864, 
Halleck played a major role in determining the army's com­
pliance with international law. A person whose opinion he 
came to rely upon for answers to many legal questions was 
Francis Lieber. A native of Prussia, Lieber had fought in 
the Waterloo campaign under Blucher and had been wounded 
in the engagement. After the war he joined and later be­
came a leader in Friedrich Jahn's educational movement.
Its philosophy emphasized the need for physical training 
and conditioning as an integral part of the educational 
process. It was during this period that Lieber joined 
several liberal student groups and came under suspicion in 
1819 by the reactionary governing officials. He was refused 
admission to Prussian universities and the University of 
Heidelberg. Finally, after great effort, he matriculated at 
Jena University as a theology student, but soon switched to 
liberal arts and specialized in mathematics.
In 1827, Lieber came to the United States to teach 
swimming and gymnastics in Boston. Enthusiasm for the sports 
did not last, and his' business failed after a year. He then
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conceived the idea of an United States encyclopaedia. He 
convinced the firm of Carey, Lea and Carey to underwrite 
him and publish it, and Encyclopaedia Americana was born.
This project afforded him the opportunity to move in the 
intellectual circles of the young nation and gain many 
friends and acquaintances. Among the former he counted 
Charles Sumner.
The year 1835 saw the reorganization of South Carolina 
College, and Lieber was offered the newly established chair 
of History and Political Economy. He remained at the college 
for twenty-one years and served from 1849 to 1851 as acting 
president. He wrote several essays and books while in South 
Carolina, among them were Political Ethics on political phil­
osophy and Civil Liberty, a political science text book. 
Lieber was sharply critical of slavery, but he held a con­
servative view toward property rights. He believed only the 
States could legally deal with slavery, causing him to break 
with abolitionists and temporarily interrupt his friendship 
with Charles Sumner.
Lieber was unhappy living in South Carolina and jumped 
at the chance to fill the newly created chair of History and 
Political Economy at Columbia University in 1857. It was 
then that he joined the fledgling Republican Party. He was 
to remain at Columbia throughout the war, offering legal ad­
vice to anyone who would listen. After the war broke out, 
he. renewed his friendship with Charles Sumner and became 
identified with "radical republicanism11. Lieber corresponded 
with Attorney General Edward Bates on legal questions; but
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Bates, a Whig, did not always follow his advice. The Trent 
affair in 1861 inspired Lieber to call for a congress of 
publicists and authorities on international law to draw up 
codes which would have the equivalent authority in inter­
national law as the treatises of Blackstone, Kent, and Story 
had in the realm of Common law. This idea came to: naught 
however. It was also in 1861 that he revised his position 
on Federal rights over slavery, stating that Federal auth­
ority could abolish slavery.
Lieber had three sons who fought in the war, one for 
the South and two for the North. It was while he was on 
his way to visit one of the latter who was wounded at Fort 
Donelson, that he met General Halleck and initiated what 
was to become an extended correspondence.
Halleck knew of Lieber's interest in international 
law and its application to military situations. In 1859, 
Lieber had sought to introduce into West Point's curriculum, 
with the backing of then General-in-Chief Winfield Scott, a 
course on international law. This effort was rebuffed by 
West Point's commandant on the premise that the curriculum 
was already overcrowded. Halleck fully realized volunteer 
officers lacked army tradition, discipline, and professional 
concepts of the laws of war; West Pointers were little better 
off. NO concise manual existed that could be used by an of­
ficer in the field. In 1862, Halleck asked Lieber to write 
a short essay on a particularly vexing problem, treatment of 
guerrillas. Army officers tended to classify anyone not in 
a large military organization as a guerrilla.
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In August of 1862, Lieber presented his essay to 
General Halleck. Halleck read it, appreciated its concise­
ness, and gave it his approval, ordering 5000 copies printed 
for army distribution. It dealt with defining the different 
categories of guerrillas and the treatment to be accorded 
each. It did not mention community punishment for guerrilla 
actions, but dealt only with the individual punishment to 
be inflicted on the guerrilla. Partisans were a part of the 
regular army detached from the main body to engage in guer­
rilla warfare. Such persons were "part and parcel of the 
army, and as such, considered entitled to the privileges of 
the law of war. . .
Other types engaged in guerrilla actions, be they
brigands, deserters, or independent bands of the populace,
were not to be. accorded such a favor. When captured in open
warfare, they would be treated as regular partisans until
special crimes could be proved against them. These crimes
included murder, the killing of prisoners, or the sacking 
14of places. Lieber concluded that the law of warfare would 
not protect any bands who interrupted their normal non-com­
batant lifestyle with sporadic fighting.
Lieber's treatise was well received, and with greater 
areas of territory coming under occupation as the war pro­
gressed, a need was seen for a clear statement of relevant 
legal principles, as well as on the conduct of warfare. in 
November of 1862, Lieber drafted a formal letter to Halleck 
suggesting the President appoint a committee, with Halleck 
at its head, to study those questions on which the Articles
of War were silent. Halleck did not respond until early 
December when he wired Lieber to come to Washington to 
serve on a special board created by the War Department.
15This board, of which Lieber was the only civilian member, 
was assigned to draw up a code for land warfare. Lieber 
wanted to reform the entire military legal code, but was re­
buffed by the other members. The board sent form letters to 
officers asking for suggestions; however, the response was 
very light. It fell to Lieber to do the actual work of 
drawing up a code.
Lieber quickly prepared a draft during the first few 
weeks of 1863. His works, lectures, newspaper clippings, 
tests on international law, and scholarly associates were
relied upon as sources. In February, he brought the draft
16to Washington for approval. The Board decided that the
draft should be printed with large margins and several blank
pages in order that army officers and other critics could
note: suggestions. Again few responded; but those ideas that
were received were incorporated into a new revision by Lieber.
This^ version was sent to the Board for its inspection at the
end of March.. It was. at this time Halleck suggested that
Lieber add a section on civil war, rebellion, and insurrection.
In April, 1863,. the code was issued as General Orders, No.
17100. 11 It', was a- conscious effort to carry into the office
of the military governor the old American concept of a 
government of laws not of men. General. Orders No. 100 was 
the first formal attempt on the part of a national government, 
either in Europe or in America, to translate the phrase 'laws
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18of war* into a developed code." The general order gave 
substance to international law, but was open:to much inter­
pretation. It did narrow the confines of previous inter­
pretations so that great excesses could not be committed or 
proposed by a zealous military commander or a radical pol­
itician. It placed penalties on wanton violence and destruc­
tion, similar to those acts listed in Scott's order. "All 
robbery, all pillage or sacking, even after taking a place 
by main force, all rape, wounding, maiming, or; killing of 
such inhabitants, are prohibited under penalty of death, or
such other severe punishment as may seem adequate for the
19gravity of the offense."
It listed types of property that were to have special
protection. "Classical works of art, libraries, scientific
collections, must be secured against all avoidable injury,
even when they are contained in fortified places whilst be-
20sieged or bombarded." Non-combatants were also given
rights under the military occupation. "Private citizens are
no longer murdered, enslaved, or carried off to distant parts,
and the inoffensive individual is as little disturbed in his
private relations as the commander of the hostile troops can
afford to grant in the over-ruling demands of a vigorous 
21war." However, it did leave two loopholes that could 
negate the underlying humanitarian principles. They were 
military necessity and retaliation.
General Orders No. 100, while loosely codifying the 
laws of warfare, also followed United States Army precedent.
It codified, the custom of placing occupied territory under
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martial law. Military rule and force took over the func­
tions of government. Crimes were to be tried by military 
courts. Its issuance, half way through the war, gave the 
commander a somewhat clearer picture of how to treat the 
enemy's populace and property.
After its acceptance by the military, General Orders 
No. 100 was made applicable to the period of the entire war. 
The Judge Advocate General held that "where an accused is 
charged with a violation of the laws of war, as laid down 
in...General Orders No. 100...it is no defense that the 
actual offence for which he was tried was committed before 
the date of the order; the latter being merely a publication
and affirmance of the law of war as it had previously ex- 
22rsted." Thus, neither side could claim ignorance for not 
complying with the code anytime during the period of con­
flict.
Codes, like laws, however, were made to be broken. 
General Orders No. 100 while perhaps restraining some actions 
by no means halted all mistreatment. This can clearly be 
seen in a letter written by Major-General William T. Sherman, 
commander of the Department of the Tennessee, to Major R. M. 
Sawyer, Assistant Adjutant General, stationed at Huntsville, 
Alabama, in January, 1864. Major Sawyer had asked Sherman's 
opinion of how to treat inhabitants known or suspected to be 
hostile or "secesh". Sherman acknowledged that the Contin­
ental European rule was to confine war to the armies and not 
visit it upon the homes of families or private interests.
But Sherman knew of other examples and precedents. He cited
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particularly the English occupation of Ireland during the 
reign of William and Mary, when the natives were dis­
possessed of their property and a new population introduced.
Speaking directly to the situation in North Alabama, 
Sherman stated:
I would advise the commanding officers at Hunts­
ville, and such other towns as are occupied by 
our troops, to assemble the inhabitants and ex­
plain, self-evident propositions, and tell them 
that...
The Government of the United States has in 
North Alabama any and all rights which they 
choose to enforce in war— to take their lives, 
their homes, their lands, their everything—  
because they cannot deny that war does exist 
there, and war is simply power unrestrained by 
constitution or compact.
If they want eternal war, well and good; we 
accept the issue, and will dispossess them and 
put our friends in their p l a c e s . 23
The Army acknowledged international law as the guide­
line to follow for codes of conduct. Those orders and codes 
emanating from the highest echelons of the Army, e.g., Gen­
eral Orders No. 100, closely emulated the ideals of inter­
national law and recommended harsh punishment for non-com­
pliance. As one moves further from the libraries of the 
universities and the offices of the War Department, however, 
one does not find strict compliance with these orders. The 
following section will examine conduct in Alabama to see 
how it compares to the ideals found in international law 
and army directives.
Chapter III 
The Union Army in Alabama
During the second week of February, 1862, three Fed­
eral gunboats commanded by Lieutenant S. L. Phelps, entered 
Alabama on the Tennessee River with the purpose of recon- 
noitering the Tennessee Valley. During its four days in 
Alabama, the expedition sailed as far as the shoals of 
Florence, where it was able to capture and destroy several 
partially constructed Confederate gunboats. Of particular 
importance was the discovery of virtually no organized Con­
federate resistance. Most of Alabama*s troops were away, 
either on the Virginia front or with the Western Army in 
Tennessee. The main burden of defense in Alabama fell 
upon small mobile units of Confederate cavalry,^- which the
Federal chose to regard as guerrillas not entitled to any
2
military rights. The Federals also found a surprisingly
strong Unionist sympathy among the inhabitants of Northern
Alabama. Phelps was impressed with the strength of this
sentiment and- recommended recruiting this unexpected source
of manpower for the Union Army.
The first encounter with a Union force left Alabama's
private citizens optimistic. The local Confederate report
of the expedition included these statements: "The Federal
gunboats passed down the Tennessee River from Florence
yesterday and carried off large quantities of Government
stores. No injury was done to private property or to the 
3
railroad." On February 26, 1862, Major-General Don Carlos
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Buell, the Army of the Ohio's commander, issued a pro­
clamation which required the observance of the private 
property rights of the inhabitants. General Orders 13a 
followed precepts upheld in international law. "Peaceable 
citizens are not to be molested in their persons and 
property. Any wrongs to either are to be promptly cor­
rected and the offenders brought to punishment." It also 
required that compensation be made for any use of private 
property. That use could only be ordered by the highest 
commander present. Soldiers were forbidden to enter pri­
vate residences without authority, and arrests could not 
be made without the authority of the commanding general.
Any officer that neglected to provide for his troops or 
made special provisions for his own comfort would be 
punished. "The Government supplies with liberality all 
the wants of the soldier. The occasional deprivations and
hardships incident to rapid marches must be borne with
4patience and fortitude."
Early developments appeared to promise fair, rational 
treatment for Alabama's non-combatants and private property.
A river expedition had confined itself to Confederate Govern­
ment stores, and the commander of the Federal Army most 
likely to invade Alabama had issued an order protecting the 
rights of private citizens. These optimistic notes were 
quickly negated by subsequent Federal actions.
After the Battle of Shiloh, General Ormsby M. Mitchell 
saw the opportunity to implement his standing orders to 
secure the Memphis and Charleston Railroad in Alabama. He
and his men arrived in Huntsville early on the morning of 
April 11, 1862, and encountered no effective resistance. 
Troops were sent out both eastward and westward along the 
railroad, effectively ending Confederate railroad oper­
ations in Northern Alabama. These first federal troops 
to remain in Alabama for an extended period compiled a 
mixed record of conduct toward Alabama citizens. Their 
record, however, does not begin in Alabama. To understand 
their actions, an examination of their earlier Army exper­
iences and attitudes is in order.
The majority of these troops were green, although 
some had seen limited action during their movement south­
ward. At the time of their arrival in training and 
staging camps in Tennessee, definite attitudes toward the 
South and its citizens had been acquired. Army life and 
experiences modified the early idealistic aim of reuniting 
the nation to include a bitterness toward the South that 
necessitated severe punishment for its citizens. These 
early Federal volunteers of the Western Theater were im­
mediately at odds with their superiors and the military 
bureaucracy in Washington, D.C., as to what was the proper 
policy toward Southern citizens. There appeared to be a 
resentment building against the official policy of re­
specting the property of both loyal and disloyal citizens 
as early as the latter half of 1861. The supposition that 
the "secesh" deserved a stiff punishment for being, rebels 
and. traitors to the "glorious Union" became prevalent. 
Wilbur F. Hinman, a member of the Sherman Brigade, Army of
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the Ohio, reflecting after the war, believed that the ideas 
of the lower ranking soldiers on the subject of "confis­
cation" were far "in advance of those held by the double­
starred generals, and the statesmen at Washington who were 
steering the ship." Hinman calculated a two year time lag 
existed between the official policy and the early attitudes
of advocating strict punishment held by the common troops
5
in the Western Theater.
This harsh attitude did not spring up unrestrained; 
a strong impression existed in the minds of these young 
troops that they must obey orders. They had been told from 
the first day of training: "this was the first and greatest
duty of a soldier." Hinman stated: "...in our simplicity
[re-obeying orders] we allowed chickens to bite us and pigs 
to squeal for Jeff Davis with impunity; we wouldn't disturb 
a feather or a hair. ...But the innate forces were only 
slumbering and gathering strength for future months and
1,6years."
The easiest avenue for punishing the South and ex­
pressing. resentment toward her citizens was "gobbling", as 
soldiers of the Eighty-eighth Illinois Volunteers called it. 
Gobbling or foraging was the acquisition of desired items, 
"often done by purchase or trade, but whether or no, such' 
things were had - literally "gobbled," or taken away without 
heeding the owner's dissent, or caring for his opinion as to 
what the price ought to be.. " As the practice became wide­
spread, all thought of compensation was dropped, and it be­
came very difficult to convince the troops that they should
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not be allowed to "go in". General Buell continued to issue 
orders forbidding foraging and soldiers did so at the risk 
of severe punishment. By the Spring of 1862 most units had 
found ways to circumvent the orders and minimize the dangers 
of punishment. The guards that were posted to protect 
specific property or prevent unauthorized excursions into 
the countryside, were often mess-mates who would themselves 
profit that evening around the cook fire. Often, after the 
army had remained in an area for some time, these "non-seeing" 
guards worked themselves out of the duty "as there was
0
scarcely anything left to guard."
As experience was gained, an even more secure way of 
avoiding punishment was found. A judiciously devised dis­
tribution system was set up within the camp, assuring the 
company and regimental officers of choice portions from 
the bounty gathered. This system proved most effective in 
averting punishment. Often the private soldiers were sub­
sequently allowed to construe the pertinent orders to suit
9
their needs. As Wilbur Hinman recalled:
The change came by virtue of necessity. It was 
impossible to stamp out the prevalent heresy 
that the soldiers ought to have whatever the re­
bellious country afforded that could contribute 
to their health and comfort. The average sol­
dier did not stop to consider fine questions of 
moral philosophy, and if his conscience was 
sometimes disturbed, it was so much the worse 
for the conscience.10
By April of 1862, when troops began to arrive in 
Alabama, unauthorized foraging and other action which violated 
the spirit of international law had become widespread. As the 
troops experienced Alabama warfare and saw prosperous areas
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with "bounty" of which they (the common soldier) were of­
ficially deprived, feelings intensified concerning what the 
South owed the avenging troops of the glorious Union.
General Mitchell arrived in Huntsville, Alabama and 
occupied that immediate section of the Memphis and Charleston 
Railroad with a division of infantry and various support units. 
The total comprised about eight thousand effective men. Ex­
peditions were successful in expanding Union control over the 
railroad and as early as the evening of April 12th Mitchell 
was able to report: "We have nothing more to do in this
11region, having fully accomplished all that was ordered."
This particular appraisal of the" situation by Mitchell was
short-lived; by late April he began to repeatedly request
reinforcements. Imagined Confederate forces were reported
to headquarters, and those that were actually seen had their
number exaggerated. An example was an expedition against
Bridgeport, Alabama, where General Mitchell reported first
the presence of five thousand infantry and one regiment of
cavalry? later he estimated the strength of the same force
at five regiments of infantry and eighteen hundred cavalry.
The Confederate reported their strength at "4 50 raw infantry"
12and "150 cavalry". Mitchell grew so apprehensive that he 
opened direct communications about reinforcements with 
Secretary of War E. M. Stanton, going over the head of his 
commander, General Buell. Mitchell proved to be less than 
ideal as an independent commander, his failings were aptly 
illustrated by inability and apparent refusal to control his 
troops.
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The Federal response to the harassment given by Con­
federate forces wasp severe. Mrs. W. D. Chadick, a citizen 
of Huntsville reported arrests of several civilians in late 
April because of their secessionist beliefs. On April 28th, 
186 2 she noted in her diary:
General Mitchell has been in a rage all the week 
on account of the cutting of the telegraph poles 
and lines, the tearing up of the railroad tracks, 
firing into trains, and holds the citizens respon­
sible, for the same, having had 12 of the most 
prominent arrested. It is probable that the work 
of our Cavalry has annoyed him excessively, as 
they are constantly picking off his men.^
J. B. Moore of Tuscumbia recorded in his diary on
April 30, 1862, reports of Federal raids upon the countryside.
He was outraged to hear of the robbery of widows and the
taking of all the food at several plantations. He concluded
that "it must be that the worst part of the army were sent
14down in this valley."
May did not open on a very cheery note for the civilian 
populace of North Alabama. Captain John Beatty reported his 
reactions on May 2nd after a train on which he was riding was 
fired upon, wounding several men. He had the train stopped 
and took a squad of soldiers back with him to Paint Rock, the 
site of the incident. He called the citizens of the village 
together and announced:
...that this bushwacking must cease. The Federal 
troops had tolerated it already too long. Here­
after everytime the telegraph wire was cut we 
would burn a house; every time a train was fired 
upon we should hang a man; and we would continue 
to do this until every house was burned and every 
man hanged between Decatur and Bridgeport..., We 
proposed to hold the citizens responsible for 
these cowardly assaults, and if they did not drive 
these bushwackers from amongst them, we should make 
them-more uncomfortable than they would be in hell.
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I then set fire to the town, took three citizens 
with me, returned to the train, and proceeded to 
Huntsville.  ^5
This action met with the approval of General Mitchell and en­
thusiasm by Beatty's fellow officers and men. Arrests and 
the burning of all buildings in an arbitrarily set radius 
from an incident became a widespread practice with no re­
spect for the inhabitant's sympathies, be they pro-Union or 
secessionist.
General Mitchell sought, approval for such strict 
measures from Secretary of War Stanton, rather than re­
questing further guidelines from his superior, General Buell. 
Mitchell described for the Secretary of War, in a telegram 
sent May 5, 1862, the harassment of his soldiers by what he 
termed armed citizens, and guerrilla bands of cavalry. He 
reported, the steps taken in response. "I have arrested some 
prominent citizens along the line of the railway and in this 
city [Huntsville]. I hold prisoners (citizens) against whom 
the negroes will prove charges of unauthorized war. Am I to
convict on the testimony of blacks? Have I your authority
16to send notorious rebels to a Northern prison?" Stanton, 
absent at that time, did not answer. P. H. Watson, the as­
sistant Secretary of War, authorized Mitchell to send two or
three notorious rebels to Fort Warren, Boston Harbor, if
17Mitchell deemed it necessary.
Mitchell however, had to direct his attention to the 
action of his Eighth brigade under the command of Colonel
John B. Turchin. On May 2, 1862 the brigade had entered and
)
occupied Athens, Alabama, a small railroad town with Unionist
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leanings. Upon entering, Turchin had the regiments stack 
their arms, and then allowed his troops to plunder and pillage 
the town and adjacent countryside, making no effort to re­
strain them. Turchin, a native of Russia and a recent im­
migrant, was brought up in the East European military trad­
ition of "to the victor belong the spoils". Mitchell was 
shocked by the reports of the conduct of his troops coming 
from Athens. The fact that these were troops of his command, 
however, made Mitchell extremely reluctant to punish them.
The citizens of Athens presented affidavits, dated 
May 3, 1862 of forty-five individuals who had suffered deprad- 
ations at the hands of the officers and men of the Eighth 
Brigade. Mitchell*s refusal of their claim for $54,689.80 in 
this case of undisputed atrocity was flippantly counter to 
international law. His explanation to a delegation from 
Athens for his inability to punish the offenders or to offer 
recompence to the citizens was. as follows:
I greatly fear, gentlemen, you are laboring under 
a very serious misapprehension. I sincerely hope 
that no remarks of mine could have led you to 
imagine that the government of the United States 
would pay individual for robberies suffered at 
the hands of individuals, acting not only without 
orders, but contrary to the most positive and re­
peated orders. ...those who are guilty are but 
robbers and plunderers, and must be treated such.
I cannot arraign before a court, civil or military, 
a brigade, and I most deeply regret that a portion 
at least of your time had not been occupied in 
searching for the testimony which would have fixed 
the charge of pillage and plunder upon some indiv­
idual officer or soldier under my command. -
Mitchell was forced by public pressure to recognize
the existence of outrages committed by his command and on
May 19, 1862, appeared to take positive steps toward discipline.
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He wired Secretary of War Stanton acknowledging the outrages
and asking for authority to impose stiff punishments. The
telegrams stated in part:
The most terrible outrages - robberies, rapes, 
arson, and plundering - are being committed by 
lawless brigands and vagabonds connected with 
the army, ...in regiments remote from headquarters,
I hear the most deplorable accounts of excesses 
committed by soldiers.
I beg authority to control these plunders by 
visiting upon their crimes the punishment of 
death.^
This authority was granted, but Mitchell made no move to use 
it. In fact, nothing was done to discipline his troops.
The situation remained unchanged until Major-General 
Don Carlos Buell's arrival in late June 1862. His description 
of the state of affairs was not heartening for the local non- 
combatants or the Union Army. Troops lacked discipline and 
were scattered, many times with their whereabouts unknown.
The cavalry was broken down by marches and counter-marches 
seemingly for no purpose. The civilian population which had 
welcomed the arrival of Union troops became embittered by the 
treatment received from the soldiers acting with the apparent 
approval of their commander. No supplies had been provided 
for the Army after its arrival from Corinth, little if any­
thing had been done to repair and open the railroad to 
Nashville, and the wagon trains were worn down from hauling
cotton for speculation. No reforming measures of any kind
20had been initiated by General Mitchell. In fact, citing an 
inability to work with his commander, General Buell, Mitchell 
had arranged through the Secretary of War, a transfer to the 
Eastern Theater. This done, he left four days after Buell's
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arrival in Huntsville.
Buell then attempted personally to straighten out the 
situation in North Alabama. A general court-martial was con­
vened at Athens on July 7, 1862, to try Colonel Turchin and 
other officers of the Eighth Brigade. In particular, Colonel 
Turchin faced three charges. Turchin was first charged with
"neglect of duty, to the prejudice of good order and military
21 . . discipline." This charge dealt with Turchin's allowing his
command to march into Athens and then plunder and pillage the 
town and countryside in his presence or with his knowledge, 
while doing nothing to restrain them. Specific examples of 
this included soldiers entering houses, taking all the pro­
visions and clothing they could lay their hands on while 
maliciously damaging and destroying anything they could or 
would not take, including carpets, pianos, furniture and 
libraries. The businesses of the town were broken into and 
their cash and goods taken. Part of the brigade went to an 
outlying plantation and "quartered in the negro huts for
weeks, debauching the females and roaming with the males
22over surrounding country to plunder and pillage."
The second charge was for "conduct unbecoming an of-
23ficer and a gentleman". This dealt with Turchin1s failing
to make any "reasonable, and proper” effort to prevent the
behavior of his troops as described in the first charge.2^
The third charge was concerned with Turchin's violation of
25General Orders 13a. A detail of seven officers found Tur­
chin guilty. On August 6, 1862, Turchin was sentenced "to
2 6be dismissed from the service of the United States". This
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was not well received by the officers and men of the division. 
Many felt that Turchin had acted reasonably under the circum­
stances and Buell's insistence on a court-martial decreased 
even more the general's popularity with the men. Buell was 
thought to be hampering the war effort by his insistence on 
strict discipline and moderate conduct. In line with their 
opposition to Buell and their leaning toward punishment of 
the South, six members of the court recommended clemency on 
the grounds that "the offense was committed under exciting 
circumstances, and was one rather of omission than of com­
mission. The general commanding [Buell] ...felt constrained
27nevertheless to carry the sentence into effect."
Colonel Turchin, however, was not without friends in 
the War Department. On August 5, 1862 he was appointed 
brigadier-general, United States Volunteers. He accepted the 
commission on September 1, 1862 and remained in service until 
October of 1864.
After the occupation of Corinth, Mississippi, on May 30, 
1862, Northern Alabama saw increased Union troop movements as 
Halleck focused attention on taking and controlling eastern 
Tennessee. A stream of Union soldiers poured eastward through 
the Tennessee Valley on their way to Chattanooga and other 
points in Georgia and Tennessee. Many of these soldiers found 
time to record their impressions of the land they were passing 
through. Wilbur Hinman, marching across Alabama in June, 186 2 
reported that their strict orders against foraging were allowed 
to lapse, action that the troops appreciated, for as Hinman 
stated: "the country through which we passed afforded us
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28frequent relief from the regulation diet". Upon arrival
in Decatur, Alabama on June 28th Hinman recorded a telling
impression: "But General Mitchell had recently been there,
and its deserted streets and blackened ruins told the story
29of his devastating visit". Moving on through the country, 
Hinman1s brigade camped one evening near an isolated plan­
tation. The men "borrowed" books from the library and also 
a few articles of "domestic use", all of which they promised 
to return after the war. The plantations* poultry and produce 
were not spared from this "borrowing". Hinman admitted that 
such action would surely be condemned if committed at the 
time his book was published (1897), "but in those days the 
precepts of the Bible were to the average soldier, less potent 
as a controlling influence than an empty stomach".^
Hinman * s unit was not the only one while marching 
across Alabama to disobey orders. Asbury Kerwood of the 
Fifty-seventh Indiana Volunteers remembered June in Alabama 
as being the time when the troops were first allowed the free 
use of fence-rails for fires, etc. without opposition from the 
officers.^
The hot days of August 1862, saw an increased desire by 
the Union command to ravage the countryside. C. W. Wills, 
writing a letter to his sister, reported of orders given them 
to "put every woman and child (imprison the men) across the 
line that speaks or acts secesh, and to burn their property, 
destroy all their crops, cut down growing corn, and burn all 
the cribs. That is something like war". Such orders did not 
sit well with: all federals. The thought of burning a house
42
of familiar "secesh" was repulsive, but there was no doubt
32of the "justice" of such orders, Wills believed.
Stationed at Tuscumbia, Wills noted that the people
were taken aback by the free and easy manner in which the
federal soldiers "gobbled" their possessions. He wrote:
We are raking in about 100 bales of cotton per 
day and could get more if we had the trans­
portation. It makes the chivalry howl, which 
is glorious music to our ears, and the idea of 
considering these confederacies something else 
than erring brothers is very refreshing.33
General Buell lost his command late in 1862, largely
because of his moderate policies and his Democratic politics.
A commission was convened in Cincinnati during November of
186 2 to investigate charges that Buell had hampered the
achieving of Union objectives. Parts of the testimony heard
during the commission dealt with conduct in Northern Alabama.
Captain Joseph J. Slocum, a defense witness and commissary of
subsistence was questioned by General Buell about the conduct
of troops under General Mitchells command. He answered:
We had some regiments in that division who were 
extremely hard to control; but they were partic­
ularly good at the warfare that was carried on 
there,! suppose, of abusing the people. For in­
stance, the Nineteenth Illinois has the credit of 
having a hard reputation. The Tenth Ohio was a 
pretty good regiment in that way, but it was under 
discipline. These regiments, particularly the 
Nineteenth Illinois, were kept out, I believe, as 
much as possible to the extreme for bushwacking 
purposes, as we called it. They were very good at 
that and a very fine regiment when brought into 
action.34
Another defense witness, Colonel Marc Mundy of the Twenty- 
third Kentucky Infantry, stated that articles in Northern 
newspapers condemning Buell*s policies had a demoralizing 
effect on the troops. Such articles were able to convince
43
the troops that it was their right to punish the South.
This in combination with the publication of General Pope * s
announced "tough western" policy (upon taking command of
the Army of the Potomac) made it difficult to keep the
35troops disciplined. The commission found that Buell
could not be punished for following a conciliatory policy.
They reasoned that it was at that time understood to be
the policy of the Government and he could violate no orders
3 6on the subject, because there were none. General W. S.
Rosecrans assumed command of the Army of the Ohio in October,
1862 bringing an end to the "conciliatory" policy orders of
his predecessor.
It was the Autumn of 1863 before Northern Alabama again
saw large concentrations of Union troops. By then, taking
items that might add to one's comfort was standard procedure
for many of the soldiers finding themselves in Northern
Alabama. Large scale foraging became common practice.
As soon as we came in sight of camp, the infantry 
went in squads in search of meat, with guns. The 
woods were full of hogs, and it soon sounded like 
heavy skirmishing, General.Smith, riding in great 
fury back and forth, endeavoring to punish the 
guilty parties and put a stop to it. He tied up 
several men by the limbs all night, but the boys 
got their hogs. He is gettin unpopular very fast 
with the men.
Later, J.. L. Jones wrote again of General Smith's 
inability to enforce strict discipline. In November of 1863, 
he wrote that a camp guard was established to keep the men 
from leaving the camp with guns. The men had been accustomed 
for too long to easy foraging, however, to be stopped. The 
guards looked the other way as meat and other supplies were
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brought into camp. J. L. Jones recorded that his mess
had "six chickens, a beef and a goose ... on stock for 
3 8eight men". This same unit altered its behavior in 
regards to foraging when their rations changed. When 
fresh meat was issued to the men, hardly any foraging for 
farm animals took place, rather the men confined their ef­
forts to finding fodder for their animals.
Moses D. Gage, moving across Alabama in late 18 63, 
recorded events which occurred as his unit marched through 
areas not previously visited by the Union Army.
The people were astonished at the coolness with 
which their well-filled larders were emptied 
of the precious contents. But entreaties and 
tears were of no avail. With a simple inquiry 
"Where is the man who belongs here?" and the 
reply "he is in the army;" they were well sat­
isfied of their right to consume the supplies 
of armed foes. They often presumed that the 
husband, son, or brother was absent as an armed 
rebel, without making any preliminary inquiry.
...And, a very good reason, in addition to all 
this, was that these people were living much 
better than the army not withstanding their 
enmity, and this ought not to be permitted.
And it is worthy of remark that for a time few 
fared better than the soldiers.39
Charles W. Wills wrote to his sister in December of
1863 that he was ordered to do duties which distressed his
sense of moral conduct. He thought that he had done his
worst when ordered to confiscate horses and mules. Now,
however, he was told to go and confiscate all the sheep he
could find. Wills considered this to be stealing as the
people he was taking the sheep from were poor with hardly
an item of sustenance, certainly not a well off Southern
40plantation owner. Wills was proud of the fact that none
45
of the men under his command were guilty of unauthorized 
robbery, plundering, or stealing. He believed that he was 
the only officer in his detachment that could make such a 
claim. He consistently discouraged such conduct and kept 
a close eye on his men. He wrote in a letter to his sister 
that he was willing to be responsible for all that they 
did.41
Those inhabitants of Alabama who suffered the most 
from Federal troops were the people living on isolated farms 
in the back country. They had no one to appeal to for pro­
tection, especially on those farms whose men were off with 
the army. Besides finding themselves the victims of or­
ganized foraging expeditions, they were also terrorized by
tL
the stragglers and renegades from both armies. The philosophy
of even the most moderate unit in the field was at least the
equivalent of the suggestion by one of the staff officers of
the Sherman Brigade. Major William McLaughlin told his men
"when you're out, don11 starve".
Colonel Hans C. Heg, writing home described a visit to
a plantation:
I got a good glass of wine and some nice Ham,
Bread, Milk and preserves for my Dinner. She 
was a widow woman - and was very anxious to 
have some one stay and take care of her chickens, 
turkeys and geese. I took as'good care of her 
as I could - but the boys got about all her 
geese, and turkeys anyhow.
...Our living has been good now for a few days - 
plenty of peaches - chickens, turkeys, and 
sweet potatoes.
Food was not the only item taken by troops as they 
passed, farms. Furniture was often destroyed, anything val­
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uable and portable was carried away and anything left, in­
cluding all buildings, was usually set afire. The Coleman 
family near Athens had the misfortune of being visited.
The unit ransacked the house from top to bottom. They de­
stroyed the furniture and other household items. Mrs. 
Coleman pleaded with the man who she thought was in charge, 
to stop the men. His reply was "Damn you, I have no pro­
tection for you - pitch into that home, men and sack it." 
They continued to search for valuables and when nothing
more could be found, the house was set afire. The women
43of the farm were left watching the buildings burn.
Thomas Stevenson marching with the Seventy-eighth
Ohio Volunteer Infantry over the Sand Mountains of Northern
Alabama noted that the area was inhabited by many poor and
destitute people, unlike the prosperous areas along the
Tennessee River. The passing of the Army threw great terror
into them and despite their poor economic condition "many of
44them [were] robbed and plundered of everything". Benjamin 
McGee and the Seventy-second Indiana Volunteer Infantry went 
into camp near Mooresville, Alabama in February, 1864. He 
wrote that if there was one thing this particular unit ex­
celled, it was its ability to forage. Colonel Biggs of the 
One Hundred Twenty Third Illinois, however, issued strict 
orders to the Seventy-second that foraging should entirely 
cease, any soldier caught foraging or with any forage in his 
possession would be severly punished. McGee wrote:
Of course our boys were too good soldiers and too 
well drilled in discipline not to obey; but the 
first thing they did after getting the order, was
47
to dig in each bunk a subterrean receptable for 
hams, chickens, pigs, flour, dried fruit, potatoes, 
and molasses, which somehow or other, would keep 
coming into camp and getting into the very places 
prepared to receive them.45
This ability to "encounter" such forage by McGee and his unit
was all the more remarkable as they were camped in the Sand
Mountains region, the area mentioned by Stevenson as being so
poor.
Northern Alabama, along the Tennessee River, remained
a rich store house for passing troops, but the years of Federal
presence there had taken its toll. Carrol Quenzel marched with
the Thirty-ninth Ohio Volunteers to Decatur, Alabama in mid-
April 1864. Quenzel described Decatur as a town that had
"suffered more from the ravages of war" than any place he had
been. "A great many of the buildings have been torn down to
give range for the Batteries, and for the formation of Rible
pits. There are no citizens here. All the inhabitants have
46been sent away, both loyal and disloyal."
Huntsville had suffered also at the hands of the Fed-
erals, but not to the degree of Decatur. By 1864 the local
commander no longer had to ask permission of the Secretary of
War to send citizens behind the lines. Mrs. Chadick recorded
in her diary that: "Twelve of the most prominent citizens,
original secessionists, have been arrested and called upon to
take the oath of allegiance. They all refused to a man, and
4 7are ordered to leave the lines". Officers were often quar­
tered with local citizens during their stay in Huntsville.
Mrs. Chadick reported good experiences with her forced boarders. 
Although she did not welcome them, those that stayed with her
48
were well behaved and did not damage her property. She
recorded in her diary though, that such destruction was
not an unusual experience. Many of the officers and their
wives plundered the houses they were staying in when
48ordered to move on. The local clergy were not immune 
from Federal scrutiny either. Mrs. Chadick wrote on Dec­
ember 31, 1864 that:
Mr. Bannister (Episcopal rector) received notice 
today that, if he could not pray for Lincoln, he 
could not officiate in his church on the morrow 
and that he would be sent South.49
She went on to record that she personally knew of many Fed­
eral officers who were ashamed of the way the Army acted to­
ward the local civilians. Officially, though it was known 
that the Confederate cavalry was operating in the area, the 
Federals insisted that it was the work of the bushwhackers 
and renegades supported by the inhabitants. On that premise 
many house burnings took place in retribution for attacks on 
Federal troops and any prisoners captured were often not ac­
corded the rights of prisoner of war, but rather treated as 
criminals. ^  •
Mrs. Chadick saw no rhyme or reason to the Federal acts.
Mr. Jolly, a Huntsville native with Unionist sympathies, found
his house plundered.
...they took everything that they could lay their 
hand upon. Childrens clothes, jewelry, hoop skirts, 
going into the rooms where the young ladies were 
not yet out of bed.51
A friend, Mr. Bob Smith, was "deported" without warning when
he went down to the train to see Dr. Ross off, who was being
"deported". His crime was that he offered the doctor some
49
money for the trip. For that action, he was carried off
without getting to tell his family of the situation or the
52opportunity to get a change of clothes.
William Hartpence, with the Fifty-first Indiana Vol­
unteers, found himself in the area north of Athens in Dec­
ember 1864. Although much visited by Federals, it still had 
much to offer an enterprising forager. He reported that:
[we]...were subsisting largely off the fat of 
the land - which was pretty fat at that time.
...The way we absorbed the material products 
of that section, must have created in the 
minds of the natives grave apprehension of a 
famine. "Are you-uns-all gwine t* ruin we- 
uns-all?" they asked; and we assured them 
that we had come to save themI Then we went 
on saving the fine sweet potatoes, dried 
fruit, pork, honey, etc. which these hypo­
critical people had been industriously cul­
tivating and preserving to feed the rebel 
army with.^3
Extreme South Alabama did not have the same ex­
tensive experience with Union troops which Northern Alabama 
had. Its experience was limited to minor cavalry raids 
from Union forces based in Florida and then in the closing 
days of the war, the taking of Mobile by a Union fleet and 
army.
The greatest activity by Union forces in South Alabama
occurred in 1865. The Reverend Timothy H. Ball reporting on
a small expedition which passed through Clarke county wrote
that very little damage was done. A building was burned, and
the troops committed "some havoc", but two hundred bales of
54cotton were either not noticed or ignored. Conecuh county 
was not. as fortunate in its experience with an expedition 
from Florida. B. F. Riley, historian of the county, reported
50
that the Federal troops entered Evergreen, Alabama without
resistance. Even so, families had their valuables stolen
55and livestock driven off.
Parthenia Hague, a school teacher employed near
Eufaula, Alabama, described the effect of receiving news
that the "Yankees are coming" on the plantation where she
lived. As the news spread from house to house:
Planters hastily fled td/ -the swamps and the 
deep unfrequented woods, with their stock 
and valuables. At intervals throughout the 
day, droves of cattle and hogs were driven 
past my employer1s residence to hiding places 
in the woods; and wagons and carriages,:filled 
with whatever valuables could be quickly gotten 
together, were also passing by.^6
The women were left on the plantation to greet the Yankees.
Miss Hague did not resent the fact that the planter did not
stay. She and the other women believed that his presence
would have done them no good and perhaps harm. She cited
the possibilities of his being hung or tortured to discover
the hiding place of his valuables. These were actions which
57she had heard of occurring elsewhere. Miss Hague was par­
ticularly upset that the Yankees did not respect the condition
of their victims. If the family did not have enough food for
■\
another meal, the soldiers would obtain their satisfaction by
burning the houses, gins, and cotton. The women and children
were forced to watch as their trunks, bureaus, and wardrobes
were kicked open. "Whatever struck the soldiers fancy was
appropriated; to the rest of the contents, as apt as not, a
match would be applied, and the labor of years would swirl 
58up in smoke."
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Eliza Walker wrote of her experience with Federal
cavalry troops which visited her family plantation late in
the war. Her mother tried to defy the troops and prevent
destruction on the grounds that a temporary armistice had
been declared. This * defianee was to no avail, the troops
took whatever appeared valuable and helped themselves to any
food that caught their eye. They turned out the stock and
left the corn cribs empty. Her conclusion to this visit was:
59"Everywhere they went was marked by devastation."
In South Alabama Union forces took Mobile on April 12,
1865. At first the occupation of Mobile went smoothly; the
Federals conducted themselves according to the "rules of
civilized warfare", much to the surprise of the inhabitants.
But it was not long before the citizens began to feel the
heavy hand of the Union presence. Mrs. Laura Robert Pillans
recorded in her journal on April 13th:
The indulgent Yanks are beginning to unsheath 
their claws; already it is said they they have 
been looking around for pleasant houses and 
have taken such a fancy to our neighbor Maguires' 
house as to signify to him their wish to possess 
it and, so Mr. Me.- has nothing else to do but give
it up peaceably. The screw begins to turn a
little. 6'Q
Mrs. Pillans also reported a good experience with the Army
later in the month. She had had a horse and cart stolen by
an Irishman when the Confederate Army left. She went down to 
the provost-marshall and reported the event. A squad of sol­
diers were sent out and soon arrested the man and recovered 
the horse and cart. The man was sent to Ship Island, and 
Mrs. Pillans was well pleased with having the horse returned.
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Expeditions were sent out from Mobile to scout the 
countryside. One such expedition visited the plantation of 
Alexander Anderson whose nephew, Ephraim Alexander, happened 
to be visiting the plantation on sick leave from the First 
Missouri Confederate Brigade. Ephraim Anderson recorded the 
effect of a visit by several squads of Union cavalry to the 
plantation. The house and outbuildings were completely sacked. 
An ox and several hogs were left dead in the fields, killed 
for the joy of it. The poultry was gone and the smokehouse 
cleaned out, it had contained the product of nearly fifty hogs. 
All the stored vegetables were taken. He concluded by 
writing "...everything was turned upside down, and it seemed 
scarcely worthwhile to straighten up, as the county was now 
entirely exposed to this system of Federal plunder and de­
vastation.
The occupation of Mobile under active war conditions 
was short lived, on May 5, 1865, General Taylor surrendered 
the remaining Confederate forces east of the Mississippi 
River to General E. R. S. Canby at Citronelle, Alabama. Due 
to the brevity of action, no record of Union conduct was 
clearly established in South Alabama.
Chapter IV 
The Cavalry Raids
Alabama was not the scene of large armies maneuvering 
against each other, it did experience extensive raids by 
Union cavalry. The State's position as a major supplier of 
foodstuffs and manufactured goods to the Confederacy caused 
it to be the object of raids, which were also intended to 
divert Confederate attention away from the Union Army's main 
objectives.
The scene of many minor raids by mounted Federals, 
Alabama was also the unwilling host of three major raids. 
Colonel A. D. Streight led the first major raid in April of 
1863, Major-General L. H. Rousseau followed with a more suc­
cessful raid in July of 1864, and in April of 1865, Major- 
General J. H. Wilson led what has been called a model raid 
through the heart of Alabama.
Streight introduced large scale cavalry operations to 
Alabama with seventeen-hundred men mounted on mules (through 
a supply mix-up) on April 21, 1863. His aim was to create 
confusion in the rear of General Braxton Bragg's Confederate 
Army, seek recruits among the Union sympathizers in Northern 
Alabama and to destroy what Confederate Government supplies 
he could find. His written orders read in part:
For all property taken for the legitimate use of 
your command you will make cash payments in full 
to men of undoubted loyalty; give the usual con­
ditional receipts to men whose loyalty is doubtful, 
but to rebels nothing. You are particularly com­
manded to restrain your command from pillage and 
marauding. You will destroy all depots of supplies
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of the rebel army, all manufactories of 
guns, ammunition, equipment, and clothing 
for their use.-*-
The raid was designed with General G. M. Dodge to 
lead a cavalry feint due south through Alabama to draw off 
Forrest, while Streight headed toward Rome, Georgia, The 
feint did not work and Forrest was soon dogging Streight*s 
every step. Streight barely had time to confiscate fresh 
horses as Forrest kept after him twenty-four hours a day. 
Streight was forced to stop because of exhaustion near Cedar 
Bluff, Alabama, and Forrest, with a much smaller force, was 
able to bluff him into surrendering. Streight did not have 
time to show whether he would have followed his written or­
ders concerning pillaging and marauding. Almost all his 
time was spent trying to elude capture.
General Dodge had more time to conduct his secondary 
raid, and faced no effective opposition. Daniel Ambrose, 
riding with Dodge, recorded his impressions. He wrote on 
April 23rd: "Today we witness war's desolating scourge on
the plantations. The devouring elements of fire are doing 
their work. The Alabama Union cavalry and the Kansas Jay-
hawkers are on the war path? their day has come - their day
2of retribution." The Alabama Union cavalry built their 
reputation of being especially harsh on the citizens of the 
South at this time, but for most of the war, they were unable 
to live up to that reputation as they were dismounted due to 
lack of horses.
Dodge * s accomplishments were summed up as having de­
solated the garden spot of Alabama, while inflicting deserved
55
punishment on her citizens. Dodge reported: "Cattle,
sheep, cows, and hogs we captured and used by the thousands,
and I did not leave a thing in the valley that I considered
3
would in the least aid the enemy." Dodge believed that his
command had conducted itself well. He could recall but one
instance in his report where his troops disobeyed his orders
and burned some houses. He issued orders that anyone caught
in such an act would be shot. After that "nothing was burned
4
except by my order".
Streight's raid did not give a true picture of how a 
cavalry raid could affect non-combatants and their private 
property. General Dodge had more opportunity to conduct a 
raid as he pleased, but his was but a small feint and did not 
serve as an actual example of a major raid in action. Gen­
eral L. H. Rousseau was issued orders in the summer of 1864 
which authorized another Federal raid. The orders gave Gen­
eral Rousseau opportunity to exercise his own discretion on 
treatment of non-combatants and private property.
On July 10, 1864, Major-General L. H. Rousseau began a 
cavalry raid into Alabama that would last nine days and cover 
300 miles. He had two brigades with which to divert attention 
and create’ confusion in the rear of Johnston's Army during 
Sherman's Atlanta campaign. Rousseau's main objective was to 
destroy the West Point and Montgomery Railroad and therefore 
sever Atlanta's link with Montgomery. Rousseau was ordered 
by Sherman to avoid fighting as much as possible and to concen­
trate on making a successful deep, sharp raid against the rail­
road. Forage, meat, and corn meal were to be obtained from
56
farms. With such a strong emphasis on timing, Rousseau had 
to travel light. Incidental to destroying the railroad 
Rousseau was to strike terror into the "heart of rebeldom" 
proving that no part of the Confederacy was safe from at­
tack by Federal troops.
All accounts written of Rousseau's raid comment on 
how tightly he was able to keep his men in rein and how 
private property was generally spared destruction. The Con­
federate military report by Major W. T. Walthal of Rousseau's 
action in Talladega, Alabama stated:
They acted with unusual forbearance. No damage was 
done to private property except in one or two excep­
tional cases. Safeguards were furnished to various 
families who applied. The railroad station house 
was burned, but pains were taken by them to save at 
least, a portion of the private property that happened 
to be stored in it. No effort was made to tear up 
the track. The post office was ra n s a c k e d . ^ .
Major Walthal did report that some private property was de­
stroyed by the passing Federal troops. Between Greensport 
and. Talladega, two iron manufactories were burned and in 
Talladega, a factory not in operation at the time, which
g
manufactured small-arms, was destroyed. Missed by the
troops was a camp about a mile outside of town which served
7
as a basic training center for the home guard.
Rousseau reached the West Point - Montgomery Railroad 
at Loachapoka, Alabama. There he tore up some thirty miles 
of track. The depot in Loachapoka took fire accidentally 
from the burning ties and other materials on the nearby track. 
Rousseau had his men fight the fire and with great exertion 
was able to keep it from spreading beyond the railroad
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8buildings. After leaving Loachapoka Rousseau made his 
way into Georgia and joined Sherman.
By far the largest cavalry raid carried out in
Alabama was Wilson's in April of 1865. Designed as a
severe blow to the heart of the South, it has been called
the example of a large cavalry operation. Its purpose was
to create a major diversion for Canby's action against
Mobile. General James H. Wilson's orders gave him ample
discretion as an independent field commander. Gerald
Wilson had at his command approximately thirteen thousand
effective troops. After a three week delay due to rain,
the raid began on March 22, 1865. The Tennessee Valley
through which it first moved had been devastated by two
years of constant warfare. General Wilson was obliged to
scatter his troops over a wide expanse of the country in
order to provide his command with sustenance as it passed
through the valley and the poor hill country to the south
of it. The Federals had no fear of organized Confederate
resistance since Forrest was camped at West Point, Mississ- 
. . 9ip.pi. Benjamin McGee with the Seventy-second Indiana 
Volunteers recalled his orders received before commencing 
the. raid were "to get our living and forage off the country, 
and to take with us or destroy everything that would be of 
service to the rebel cause".^
On March 30th, General Wilson ordered General John T. 
Croxton's brigade detached with orders to move on Tuscaloosa. 
This action wad done to cover Wilson's supply trains from 
the Confederates. Croxton's orders read in part: "proceed
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rapidly by the most direct route to Tuscaloosa to destroy
the bridge, factories, mills, university (military school),
11and whatever else may be of benefit to the rebel cause".
Advance scouts from Croxton1s brigade reached Tusca­
loosa on April 3rd. A3 they passed the time waiting for 
Croxton, they became bold, roaming the streets. Renegade
Southerners joined them and drinking became widespread, which
12resulted in numerous reports of looting. After Croxton 
arrived the business of destroying the university and various 
factories was undertaken. Although the school was defended 
by a small corps of its cadets, they were no match for the 
Union soldiers and: after putting in an appearance, they beat 
a hasty retreat toward Montgomery. Almost the entire plant 
of the school was put to flames, which spread to neighboring 
houses.
At the Rotunda, Professor Andre DeLoffre made a 
brave attempt to save the library, of which he 
was custodian. He appealed to the officer in 
charge of the raiding squad to spare one of the 
finest libraries in the whole South. The of­
ficer himself must have had some appreciation 
for books. He restrained his men while he sent 
to General Croxton a message asking whether it 
was imperative for this excellent library to be 
burned. The General replied curtly that his 
orders left him no discretion; the library must 
go. The officer then... ordered the building 
burned.^3
Only four buildings~ ~from the University of Alabama *s campus
survived Croxton1s visit. Ironically, one of those was the
Round House, the only campus building erected expressly for
14military purposes.
Selma was one of the prime objectives of Wilson's raid. 
It was a major manufacturing center for the South. Within
its boundaries, almost every type of war material was
manufactured. Selma had assumed the position of a major
supply point for the South in 1863 and expanded that role
during the subsequent years. There were arsenals and iron
works, which turned out shell and shot, and items ranging
from horseshoe nails to steam boilers. Clothing was also
made within Selma’s confines, as was leather gear, chains
and wagon equipment. A saltpetre factory was located there
and at the time of the raid, an iron river boat ram was
15nearing completion in the shipyard.. Selma’s importance 
was such that General Nathan B. Forrest deemed it necessary 
to defend the town against the raid. He dismounted his men 
to man the trenches and called every able bodied citizen of 
the town to assist in its defense.
Wilson had his men in position opposite the defense 
trenches of Selma by late afternoon of Sunday, April 2nd.
He decided to attack that evening and after a sharp exchange, 
was able to break the defense line and enter the city. By 
ten Union troops had control of the town and had captured a 
major portion of the defending Confederate troops. General 
Forrest was able to escape by fleeing just as Union troops 
entered the town proper.
The night attack contributed to general confusion and 
discipline was lost as Union troops gained the town. That 
night a brick building on Broad Street was set on fire. It 
had served the Confederates as a jail for Union prisoners 
and skulkers from the Southern Army. Reportedly it was pre­
vious inmates of the institution which set the fire. This
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fire spread to other houses along Broad Street. Union soldiers
16had no inclination to fight the fires. During the night 
private residences were broken into and any resistance was 
dealt with ruthlessly. Valuables were seized and alcoholic 
beverages demanded. The extent of plundering done by the 
Union soldiers was variously reported. Ella Smith, visiting 
Selma at the time of capture, thought that reports of mis-
17treatment to the citizens of Selma were greatly exaggerated.
Another resident believed that the soldiers had been told that
if they were able to take the city before daylight, they could
do as they pleased with the town until daybreak* The town was
taken early in the evening and Mrs. C. E. Landis reported that
the Federals had all night to "drink, carouse, pillage and 
18burn". The fire in Selma continued to rage until Tudsday
night and was aided on Monday by the firing of the Naval
Foundry, Arsenal and other places of manufacturing. The city
had nearly been destroyed, but order had been reestablished
on Monday and protection was available for those who applied
for it. By Tuesday evening almost every private family had
19a soldier or soldiers stationed on their premises.
After occupying Selma for several days, Wilson moved 
on toward Montgomery, his last major objective before leaving 
Alabama. Montgomery offered no resistance to Wilson’s arrival 
and the Federal troops were able to occupy it peaceably. 
Benjamin McGee reported that several steam boats and machine 
shops were burned. Also a large amount of Confederate com­
missary and quarter-master stores were destroyed. McGee made
20a special note that private property was not molested.
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The Montgomery Advertiser reported on April 18th that
General Edward M. Cook did indeed protect the citizens of
Montgomery. His promise that no destruction would take place
had been ratified by General Wilson. A guard was posted
throughout the town and the main body of Wilson's troops
merely marched straight through on their way to Columbus,
Georgia. A few isolated incidents of robbery were reported
in the suburbs, attributed to drunken troopers. The largest
effort that Wilson's passing had on Montgomery was that all
the horses and mules were taken and a considerable number of
21negroes went off, following the army.
Moving toward Columbus, orders were issued to pick up 
all serviceable mules and horses and to mount each with an 
able-bodied negro. They in turn were to go out and gather 
supplies for the army in the form of flour, meal, chickens, 
turkeys, and pork. Thomas Dornblaser, a volunteer with the 
Pennsylvania Dragoons, reported that by this point in the 
war it was believed that "a soldier who could not forage suc­
cessfully might as well be in the hospital. To have foraged 
well was an achievement that called for higher compliment
than "to have fought we 11".^
The completion of Wilson's raid and the taking of 
Mobile, saw the war period come to an end in Alabama. Federal 
troops had compiled a mixed record. Alabama was the scene of 
both Federal outrages and remarkable restraint against-local 
citizens and private property.
Chapter V 
Conclusions
By 1861 and the start of the American Civil War, a 
great storehouse of laws and precedents existed pertaining 
to troop conduct. The standards in existence during the 
1860's exemplified a policy of moderation toward non-combatants 
and private property. Their rights were to be respected and 
no damage to or confiscation of property done without the ex­
plicit order of a superior officer. Blanket statements of 
conduct such as "seek and destroy any property that might pos­
sibly be of assistance to the enemy, and harass that population 
which shows any sympathy toward the enemy", were not recognized. 
Rather the laws called for a consistent standard of restraint.
Alabama had extensive experience with Union troops 
throughout the war. Their conduct ranged from unusually re­
strained to uninhibited pillage and marauding. The most 
powerful influence on the soldiers', conduct was their immediate 
superior officer. If the officer had the respect of his men 
and believed in the protection of the non-combatant's rights, 
invariably Alabama's inhabitants were spared harsh treatment 
and the destruction of their property. The men of Rousseau's 
and Charles W. Will's commands were examples of this behavior.
In many instances, however, as Charles Will's experience 
showed, the superior officer's desires or ideas prevailed.
If that officer or the junior officer did not believe in any 
of the precepts of international law, as was the case with 
Turchin, the troops were only held back by their own consciences,
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which did not always trouble them in the "spirit of the 
moment".
The guerrilla warfare found in Alabama caused Union 
soldiers to react harshly. They found it very frustrating 
to be faced by an enemy which could not be seen. These 
frustrations were relieved by attacking something which could 
be seen, the local population. The political beliefs held 
by the population had little effect on the severity of the 
treatment they received. Orders sometimes made a distinction 
between Unionist and non-Unionist, but the distinction was 
rarely, if ever, made in the field.
The amount of Union sentiment among the civilian pop­
ulation was a small factor in determining troop conduct. 
Confederate activity in an area could certainly bring Union 
wrath on a village or plantation. Even if individuals in a 
village or town espoused Union sentiment or treated their 
"guests" deferentially, they had no guarantee of better treat­
ment. They were likely to suffer the same fate as those who 
jeered the soldiers or made obvious their contempt for the 
Union.
Generally, throughout the war, orders were issued to 
respect the property as well as the person of non-combatants. 
As the war progressed these orders became less strict. Con­
fiscation or destruction became the rule rather than the ex­
ception. Field soldiers, feeling little or no qualms, grew 
adept at raiding the countryside for the avowed purpose of 
punishing the "secesh" and "gobbling" or destroying any item 
that "might further the cause of the South".
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Few- commanders in Alabama exercised enough discipline 
for their’ troops to believe the punishment was anything but 
an empty threat. If a- commander stood by his orders and 
punished offenders, the troops found it easy to escape de­
tection and punishment. This was the case with Jenkin Jones' 
unit: and General Smith. Often orders were nullified by the 
cooperation and sometimes actual encouragement of the junior 
officers. They had the major responsibility of maintaining 
proper discipline. Guidelines from high up the chain of 
command, e.g. General Orders 100r could not counter the pre­
vailing feeling that the citizens of the South deserved 
punishment, not protection.
In general, the conduct of Union troops in Alabama did 
not meet the standards outlined in international law or Gen­
eral Orders 100.. If not restrained by a superior officer, 
the common Union soldier, usually with a mid-western, rural 
background, was inclined to personally punish the "secesh”.
If the soldier needed to justify his action (either to himself 
or those back home), it was done by assuming a certain attitude. 
This attitude held the citizens of Alabama in low esteem. The 
citizens' desires or rights needed not to be addressed since 
they (the citizens) fell into that group known as "secesh", 
lucky to be left to live. Many times when "secesh" was used 
to describe Alabamians, the implication was that it pictured 
something less than human.
The majority of the soldiers stationed or passing through 
Alabama were volunteers, not regular army. Discipline was a 
novelty. As their experience with the Army grew, these
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"civilian" troops began to resent strict discipline. This 
was especially true when they actually arrived in the Southern 
states. The desire to punish the South combined with the 
resentment of strict discipline to make the civilian pop­
ulation the target of the troops1 aggression.
The Union soldier in Alabama, whether marching through 
the Tennessee Valley, occupying Huntsville or riding with 
Wilson was guided in his conduct more by his empty stomach 
and desire to punish the South, than by the precepts of the 
Bible or international law.'*'
APPENDIX I
Head Quarters of the Army, Tampico, February 19, 1847. Gen­
eral Orders, no. 20. 1. It may well be apprehended that
many grave offences not provided for in the act of Congress 
’establishing rules and articles for the government of the 
armies of the United States', approved April 10, 1860, may 
be again committed —  by, or upon, individual of those armies, 
in Mexico, pending the existing war between the two Republics. 
Allusion is here made to atrocities, any one of which, if 
committed with the United States or their organized ter­
ritories, would, of course, be tried and severely punished 
by the ordinary or civil courts of the land.
2. Assassinations? murder; malicious stabbing or maiming; 
rape? malicious assault and battery; robbery; theft, the 
wanton desecration of churches, cemeteries or other religious 
edifices and fixtures, and the destruction, except by order 
of a superior officer, of public or private property, are 
such offences.
3. The good of the service, the honor of the United States 
and the interest of humanity, inperiously demand that every 
crime enumerated above, should be severely punished. (para­
graphs 4-6 demonstrate the necessity of a code supplemental 
to the rules and articles of war.)
7. That unwritten code is Martial Law, as an addition to 
the written military code, prescribed by Congress in the 
rules and articles of war, and which unwritten code, all 
armies, in hostile countries, are forced to adapt —  not 
only for their own safety, but for the protection of the
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APPENDIX I con't. 
unoffending inhabitants and their property, about the 
theaters of military operations, against injuries contrary 
to the laws of war.
8. From the same supreme necessity, martial law is hereby 
declared, as a supplemental code in, and about, all camps, 
posts and hospitals which may be occupied by any part of
the forces of the United States, in Mexico, and in, and about, 
all columns, escorts, convoys, guards and detachments, of 
the said forces, while engaged in prosecuting the existing, 
war in, and against the said republic.
9. Accordingly, every crime, enumerated in paragraph No. 2, 
above, whether committed — 1..By any inhabitant of Mexico, 
sojourner or traveler therein, upon the person or property 
of any individual of the United States' forces, retainer
or follower of the same; 2. By any individual of the said 
forces, retainer or follower of the same, upon the person 
or property of any inhabitant of Mexico, sojourner or traveller 
therein, or 3. By any individual of the said forces, retainer 
or follower of the same, upon the person or property of any 
other individual of the said forces, retainer or follower 
of the same —  shall be duly tried and punished under the 
said supplemental code.
10. For this purpose it is ordered that all offenders, in 
the matters aforesaid, shall be promptly seized and confined, 
and reported, for trial, before Military Commissions to be 
duly appointed as follows:
68
11. Every military commission, under this order, will be 
appointed governed and limited, as prescribed by the 65th, 
66th, and 97th, of the said rules and articles of war, and 
the proceedings of such commissions will be duly recorded, 
in writing, reviewed, revised, disapproved or approved, and 
the sentences executed --all, as in the cases of the pro­
ceedings and sentences of courts-martial; provided, that
no military commission shall try any case clearly cognizable 
by any court-martial, and provided also that no sentence 
of a military commission shall be put in execution against 
any individual, whatsoever, which may not be, according to 
the nature and degree of the offence, as established by evi­
dence, in conformity with known punishments, in like cases, 
in some one of the States of the United States of America.
12. This order will be read at the head of every Company 
serving in Mexico.
APPENDIX II 
General Orders, No. 100.
Washington, April 24, 1863
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States 
in the Field.
Section I. Martial Law— Military jurisdiction— Military 
necessity Retaliation.
1. A place, district, or country occupied by an enemy stands 
in consequence of the occupation, under the martial law of 
the invading or occupying army, whether any proclamation 
declaring martial law, or any public warning to the inhab-^ 
itants, has been issued or not. Martial law is the immediate 
and direct effect and consequence of occupation or conquest.
The presence of a hostile army proclaims its martial law.
2. Martial law does not cease during the hostile occupation, 
except by special proclamation, ordered by the commander-in- 
chief, or by special mention in the treaty of peace concluding 
the war, when the occupation of a place or territory continues 
beyond the conclusion of peace as one of the conditions of 
the same.
3. Martial law in a hostile country consists in the sus­
pension by the occupying military authority of the criminal 
and civil' law, and of the domestic administration and govern­
ment in the occupied place or territory, and in the substi­
tution of military rule and force for the same, as well as
in the dictation of general laws, as far as military neces­
sity requires this suspension, substitution, or dictation.
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The commander of the forces may proclaim that the admin­
istration of all civil and penal law shall continue either 
wholly or in part, as in times of peace, unless otherwise 
ordered by the military authority.
4. Martial law is simply military authority exercised in 
accordance with the laws and usages of war. Military oppres­
sion is not martial law; it is the abuse of the power which 
that law confers. As martial law is executed by military 
force, it is incumbent upon those who administer it to be 
strictly guided by the principles of justice, honor, and 
humanity— virtues adorning a soldier even more than other 
men, for the very reason that he possesses the power of his 
arms against the unarmed.
5. Martial law should be less stringent in places and coun­
tries fully occupied and fairly conquered. Much greater 
severity may be exercised in places or regions where actual 
hostilities exist or are expected and must be prepared for. 
Its most complete sway is allowed— even in the commander's 
own country-~when face to face with the enemy, because of 
the: absolute necessities of the case, and of the paramount 
duty to defend the country against invasion.
To save the country is paramount to all other consider­
ations .
6. All civil and penal law shall continue to take its usual 
course in the enemy's places and territories under martial 
law, unless interrupted or stopped by order of the occupying 
military power; but all the functions of the hostile govern­
ment— legislative, executive, or administrative— whether
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of a general, provincial, or local character, cease under 
martial law, or continue only with the sanction, or, if 
deemed necessary, the participation of the occupier or in­
vader .
7. Martial law extends to property, and to persons, whether
they are subjects of the enemy or aliens to that government.
*
13. Military jurisdiction is of two kinds: First, that which 
is conferred and defined by statute; second, that which is 
derived from the common law of war. Military offenses under 
the statute law must be tried in the manner therein directed; 
but military offenses which do not come within the statute 
must be tried and punished under the common law of war. The 
character of the courts which exercise these jurisdictions 
depends upon the local laws of each particular country.
In the armies of the United States the first is exercised 
by courts-martial; while cases which do not come within the 
Rules and Articles of War, or the jurisdiction conferred 
by statute on courts-martial, are tried by military commissions.
14. Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized 
nations consists in the necessity of these measures which 
are indispensable, for securing the ends of the war, and which 
are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war.
15. Military necessity admits of all direct destruction of 
life or limb of armed enemies, and of other persons whose 
destruction is incidentally unavoidable in the armed contests 
of the war; it allows of the capturing of every armed enemy 
and every enemy of importance to the hostile government, or
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of peculiar danger to the captor, it allows of all de­
struction of property, and obstruction of the ways and 
channels of traffic, travel, or communication, and of all 
with-holding of sustenance or means of life from the enemy; 
of appropriation of whatever an enemy*s country affords 
necessary for the subsistence and safety of the army, and 
of such deception as does not involve the breaking of good 
faith either positively pledged regarding agreements entered 
into during the war, or supposed by the modern law of war 
to exist. Men who take up arms against one another in public 
war do not cease on this account to be moral beings, respons-^ 
ible to one another and to God.
16. Military necessity does not admit of cruelty— that is, 
the infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or 
for revenge, nor of maiming or wounding except in fight, 
nor of torture to extort confessions. It does not admit
of the use of poison in any way, nor of the wanton devastation 
of a district. It admits to deception, but disclaims acts 
of perfidy; and, in general, military necessity does not 
include any act of hostility which makes the return to peace 
unnecessarily difficult.
17. War is not carried on by arms alone. It is lawful to
starve the hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed, so that
it leads to the speedier subjection of the enemy.
*
21. The citizen or native of a hostile country is thus an 
enemy, as one of the constituents of the hostile state or 
nation, and as such is subjected to the hardships of the war.
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22. Nevertheless, as civilization had advanced during the 
last centuries, so has likewise steadily advanced, especially 
in war on land the distinction between the private individual 
belonging to a hostile country and the hostile country itself, 
with its men in arms. The principle has been more and more 
acknowledge that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, 
property, and honor as much as the exigencies of war will 
admit.
23. Private citizens are no longer murdered, enslaved, or 
carried off to distant parts, and the inoffensive individual 
is as little disturbed in his private relations as the com­
mander of the hostile troops can afford to grant in the over­
ruling demands of a vigorous war.
*
25. In modern regular wars of the Europeans and their descen­
dants in other portions of the globe, protection of the inof­
fensive citizen of the hostile country is the rule; privation
and disturbance of private relations are the exceptions.
*
Section II. —  Public and private property of the enemy—  
Protection of persons, and especially of women; of religion, 
the arts and sciences— Punishment of crimes against the in­
habitants of hostile countries.
*
35. Classical works of art, libraries, scientific collection, 
or precious instruments, such as astronomical telescopes, 
as well as hospitals, must be secured against all avoidable 
injury, even when they are contained in fortified places
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whilst besieged or bombarded*
*
37. The United States acknowledges and protects, the hostile 
countries occupied by them, religion and morality? strictly 
private property? the persons of the inhabitants, especially 
those of women? and the sacredness of domestic relations. 
Offenses to the contrary shall be rigorously punished.
This; rule does not interfere with the right of the vic­
torious invader to tax the people or their property, to levy 
forced loans, to billet soldiers, or to appropriate property, 
especially houses, lands, boats or ships, and the churches, 
for temporary and military uses.
38. Private property, unless forfeited by crimes or by offenses 
of the owner, can be seized only by way of military necessity, 
for the support or other benefit of the Army or of the United 
States.
If the owner has not fled, the commanding officer will
cause receipts to be given, which may serve the spoliated
owner to obtain indemnity.
*
44. All wanton violence committed against persons in the 
invaded country, all destruction of property not commanded 
by the authorized officer, all robbery, all pillage or sacking, 
even after taking a place by main force, all rape, wounding, 
maiming, or killing of such inhabitants, are prohibited under 
the penalty of death, or such other severe punishment as 
may seem adequate for the gravity of the offense.
A soldier, officer, or private, in the act of committing
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such violence, and disobeying a superior ordering him to
abstain from it, may be lawfully killed on the spot by such
superior.
*
47. Crimes punishable by all penal codes, such as arson,
murder, maiming, assaults, highway robbery, theft, burglary,
fraud, forgery, and rape, if committed by an American soldier
in a hostile country against its inhabitants, are not only
punishable, at that time, but in all cases in which death
is not inflicted, the more severe punishment shall be preferred. 
*
Section X. — insurrection— Civil War--Rebellion.
*
155. All enemies in regular war are divided into two general 
classes—  that is to say, into combatants and non-combatants, 
or unarmed citizens of the hostile government.
The military commander of the legitimate government, 
in a war of rebellion, distinguishes between the loyal citizen 
in the revolted portion of the country and the disloyal citizen. 
The disloyal citizens may further be classified into those 
citizens known to sympathize with the rebellion without posi­
tively aiding it, and those who, without taking up arms, 
give positive aid and comfort to the rebellious enemy without 
being bodily forced thereto.
156. Common justice and plain expediency require that the 
military commander protect the manifestly loyal citizens 
in revolted territories against the hardships of the war 
as much as the common misfortune of war admits.
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The commander will throw the burden of the war, as much 
as lies within his power, on the disloyal citizens, of the 
revolted portion or province, subjecting them to a stricter 
police than the non-combatant enemies have to suffer in reg­
ular war; and if he deems it appropriate or if his government 
demands of him that every citizen shall, by an oath of alleg­
iance, or by some other manifest act, declare his fidelity 
to the legitimate government, he may expel, transfer, imprison, 
or fine the revolted citizens who refuse to pledge themselves 
anew as citizens obedient to the law and loyal to the govern­
ment.
Whether it is expedient to do so, and whether reliance 
can be placed upon such oaths, the commander or his government 
have the right to decide.
157. Armed or unarmed resistance by citizens of the United 
States against the lawful movements of their troops is levying
i
war against the United States, and is therefore treason.
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